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Introduction 
Organizations can become socially dysfunctional in a number of ways.  One type of 
macro dysfunction which is receiving popular and academic attention is corporate 
illegality. Corporate illegal behavior involves actions by an individual or a group within a 
business organization that violate an administrative, civil, or criminal law, and for which 
the organization is the primary intended beneficiary (Clinard & Quinney, 1973: Schrager 
& Short, 1978; Shover, 1978).  
 
This paper contributes towards corporate illegality research by examining the relationship 
between corporate illegality and several previously untested dimensions of corporate 
board structure.  Six hypotheses are posed to test the effects of outsider dominance, joint 
CEO-board chairpersons, stock ownership, social responsibility committees, and 
attorneys on boards on the incidence of corporate crime. The paper examines 
environmental violations rather than antitrust violations, which have been the focus of 
most previous research.  We study administrative violations in addition to the criminal 
and civil infractions usually analyzed in corporate illegality research.  The paper builds 
upon existing corporate crime research, and makes unique contributions by approaching 
it from these three previously underexplored points of view.  
 
Theories of Corporate Illegality 
Theories of corporate illegality generally concur that, in order for illegal behavior to 
occur, three factors must be present.  First, there must be a motive or tension prompting 
the organization to engage in illegal behavior as a vehicle for achieving objectives and 
ensuring economic survival.  Secondly, in the presence of this motivation, circumstances 
must exist which present the opportunity to break the law without detection and/or 
excessive penalty. Given motive and opportunity, whether or not corporate illegality will 
occur will depend on the presence of effective controls designed to prevent such behavior 
(McKendall & Wagner, 1996; Baucus, 1994; Coleman, 1987; Finney & Lesieur, 1982; 
Szwajkowski, 1986). 
 
Scholars have proposed that two types of controls mitigate corporate illegal behavior. 
The first involves external constraints that provide incentives for corporate decision 
makers to abide by the law (McVisk, 1978; Yoder, 1978).  Vigilant regulatory agencies 
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and appropriate sanctions are examples of external controls.  A second type of controls 
involves internal mechanisms which encourage legal compliance and/or penalize 
transgressions.  Corporate culture and ethical practices, which establish behavioral norms 
and expectations, can function as internal control systems. 
 
Another way to implement internal controls is to enhance the "watchdog" function of 
corporate boards of directors by requiring boards to be structured in certain ways (Nader, 
Green, & Seligman, 1976; Eisenberg, 1977).  The general argument is that certain board 
structures will increase the likelihood that a company meets its responsibilities not only 
to its stockholders but to all organizational stakeholders (Freeman, 1984). While Kesner, 
Victor, and Lamont (1986) found that adding outsiders to corporate boards did not lessen 
a firm’s involvement in illegal activities, they suggested that research is needed to 
investigate what other types of boardroom reforms might reduce illegal activity of firms.  
 
Governance Structure 
The primary function of a Board of Directors is to oversee, monitor and evaluate the 
activities of a firm and its top management (Baysinger & Butler, 1985; Kesner et al., 
1986; Lorsch, 1989).  Corporate governance theory has tended to examine the types of 
board structures and constraints that best enable a board to fulfill its mission of evaluation 
and control.  This paper tests the proposition that board structure will be associated with a 
firm's tendency to engage in corporate illegal behavior.  To date, only two empirical 
studies have examined such relationships.  Kesner et al. (1986) studied 384 firms and 
found no relationship between the proportion of outside directors and civil antitrust 
violations.  They also found no relationship between whether the CEO and Chair were 
the same person and civil antitrust violations. In a study of 100 firms, Gautschi and Jones 
(1987) found that various types of illegality increased as the proportion of outside 
directors increased.  Conversely, illegal activity increased as the number of inside 
directors on the executive committee increased. 
Outsider versus Insider Dominance: ​ Outside side board members are defined as directors 
who are not current or retired managers of the organization they direct, nor of one of its 
subsidiaries (Kesner et al., 1986; Pfeffer, 1972).  Reformists contend that if boards are 
dominated by outsiders, there will be a greater variety of knowledge and experience 
present (Bacon & Brown, 1973; Firstenberg & Malkiel, 1980; Kesner et al., 1986).  It is 
argued that outside board members can serve organizational stakeholders better than 
insiders because they will more freely evaluate management's performance, and will 
more readily deter or remedy inappropriate situations. Thus, the greater independence of 
outside board members should allow them to see more clearly the potential long-term 
costs and disadvantages of illegal activity, and should enable them to resist management 
pressure to overlook such behavior (Kesner et al., 1986).  
While there is no clear evidence that boards with a greater proportion of insiders are more 
likely to act illegally (Kesner et al., 1986), it has been found that boards with a greater 
proportion of insiders are more likely to incur shareholder lawsuits (Kesner & Johnson, 
1990).  Further, a resource dependence perspective suggests that having a greater number 
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of outsiders on the board when a critical decision must be made provides greater 
resources and information and helps to establish legitimacy (Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978). 
Therefore, we argue that when faced with the motive and the opportunity to violate 
environmental law, a firm will be less likely to do so if there are more outsiders than 
insiders on the board.  Outsiders will advocate a response that protects the legitimacy of 
the firm, and their greater voting power will defeat any alternative response.  Based on 
these arguments, we pose the following hypothesis: 
 
H1:  The greater the proportion of outside directors to inside directors on the   
 board, the lesser the incidence of corporate illegality. 
 
Dual CEO-Chairperson Roles:​  There is close theoretical consensus that one individual 
should not jointly hold the roles of CEO and board chairperson (Mallette & Fowler, 
1992; Kesner et al., 1986).  The fundamental argument is that a function of the 
chairperson is to evaluate the behavior of the CEO, and this is impossible to do if both 
jobs are held by the same person (Geneen, 1984).  In short, a dual structure represents a 
conflict of interest.  If a firm is faced with a strong motive and a compelling opportunity 
to violate the law, the lack of an objective monitoring presence may make the firm more 
likely to choose illegality.  For example, the consequences of breaking an environmental 
law will be more difficult for the board chair to evaluate objectively if he/she is also the 
CEO.  Without an independent monitor, the joint CEO-chairperson may decide that the 
benefits achieved by shirking an environmental law may exceed the costs of detection. 
Lorsch noted that "providing a leader [on the board] separate from the CEO could 
significantly help directors prevent crises, as well as to act swiftly when one occurs" 
(l989: 185).  Based on these arguments, we hypothesize the following: 
 
H2:   Firms with joint CEO-board chairpersons will have a greater incidence  
of  corporate illegality than firms with separate CEOs and  chairpersons.  
 
Stock Ownership by Officers and Directors:​  There is some speculation that the degree of 
financial involvement in the firm by officers and directors may compromise their ability 
to objectively evaluative and control firm choices (Kesner et al., 1986).  Some scholars 
argue that this is not an issue because the directors of most companies do not hold a 
significant enough portion of their worth in company stock. They hold that the 
compensation received by most directors is not sufficient to align their interests with 
those of shareholders, and the stock component of most directors’ compensation is rarely 
significant enough to make company performance an incentive for them (Monks & 
Minow, 1995).  
 
However, one survey revealed that twenty-four percent of companies made stock grants 
to their directors in addition to the cash portion of the compensation package 
(SpencerStuart & Associates, 1991).  It can be argued that including a stock grant of any 
size in the compensation packages of directors encourages directors to act more in the 
interests of shareholders and less in the interests of other stakeholders.  Further, the more 
the personal fortunes of directors are dependent on the financial performance of the firm, 
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the more important financial performance becomes relative to other competing outcomes. 
Directors who own significant portions of stock in the company may be more likely to 
ignore compliance with an environmental law if they perceive such an action will 
increase company profits and thereby their personal wealth.   They may believe that it is 
more important to channel resources in ways that will directly contribute to shareholder 
returns, rather than invest them in costly equipment or processes that may be required for 
environmental compliance.  Accordingly,  
  
H3: The greater the value of stock owned by officers and directors,  
the greater the incidence of corporate illegality. 
 
Board Committees:​  Some governance reform proposals argue that boards should 
enhance their control functions by forming committees that are responsible to particular 
constituents and to protecting the public interest.  Board committees allow subgroups of 
directors to delve into details about specialized issues, such as environmental compliance, 
that the full board would not have time to consider (Lorsch, 1989). Special committees 
may include public policy, social responsibility, and the environment.  These committees 
are designed to demonstrate that the board will be committed to legal and social 
responsibility and will balance the often conflicting interests of stakeholder groups.  They 
send a message to stakeholders that the board wants to be a good corporate citizen 
(Monks & Minow, 1995).  Being good corporate citizens means complying with the law, 
particularly those laws that are directly related to the task of the committee. For example, 
it should be more difficult for a company to violate or ignore an environmental law when 
that company has a board committee whose task it is to specifically monitor the 
environmental behavior of the firm. Firms with social responsibility committees in place 
will be less likely to violate laws because the committee members will require more 
accountability from management to ensure that the firm is complying with environmental 
regulations.  In addition, the presence of such committees should send a message to the 
organization that legal and socially responsible behavior is desired and valued.  Based on 
these arguments, we hypothesize: 
 
H4:  Firms with board-level public policy or social responsibility  committees  
will have a lesser incidence of corporate illegality  
than firms without such committees.  
 
Attorneys as Board Members 
One job of the board is to evaluate management’s proposals. In complex 
situations, it may not be judicious to assume that management’s staff of consultants, 
lawyers, and other advisors will always remain truly objective when evaluating such 
proposals (Bowen, 1994: 105).  When a legal issue arises, management-retained lawyers 
may provide a limited point of view to the board.  Boards that do not have legal expertise 
of their own may be reluctant to contradict that advice. Since litigation is a complex and 
frequent threat, a board should have advisors of its own who can evaluate and challenge 
the views of management counsel (Bowen, 1994).  For example, when faced with the 
issue of how a firm should respond to an environmental law, boards with members who 
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are attorneys will have the ability to draw from their own expert legal advice, 
independent of the advice that was used to develop recommendations made by 
management.  The lawyer who is also a board member will be expected to raise questions 
and issues about the proposed action that may have been omitted by management’s.  A 
board of directors that has a lawyer as at least one of its members has readily available 
yet additional information and expertise that can help the board maintain its legitimacy 
(Pfeffer & Salancik, 1978) and its independence from management when it dealing with 
issues that involve the threat of legal liability. We therefore hypothesize: 
 
H5: Firms with attorneys on their boards will have a lesser incidence  
of corporate illegality.  
 
Methodology 
Sample:  
The sample for this study consisted of the largest 150 U.S. industrial organizations, as 
identified by the 1988 edition of Ward’s Business Directory. In order to identity these 
firms, we chose the largest public companies whose primary SIC code was in 
manufacturing.  Environmental laws are generally aimed at curtailing pollution produced 
by manufacturing firms, and publicly-owned companies are required to disclose 
information about several of the variables in the study.  In order to accurately track 
violation day, we also excluded from the population companies whose activities were  too 
dispersed (i.e., less than fifty percent of the firm’s business was conducted by the parent 
organization or a single subsidiary). We further excluded companies for which complete 
proxy statement data was not available.  
 
Dependent Variable:  
Environmental violations​: Environmental laws are among those most frequently violated 
by U.S. firms (McKendall & Wagner, 1996; Hill et al., 1992).  Environmental regulation 
in the United States is largely under the jurisdiction of the Environmental Protection 
Agency (EPA), which  administers federal environmental laws, sets standards, ensures 
compliance, and performs supportive research (Steiner & Steiner, 1988).  The EPA 
oversees legislation involving air quality, water quality, solid and toxic waste disposal, 
toxic chemicals, radiation, and noise pollution. The agency can initiate administrative, 
civil, or criminal proceedings against a company; the seven possible enforcement actions 
include warnings, recalls, agency and court orders, injunctions, monetary fines, and 
criminal prosecution of officers. Since commonly accepted definitions of corporate crime 
include any action punishable by administrative, civil, or criminal law (Clinard et al., 
1979; Reiss & Biderman, 1980; Yeager, 1986), we have included all three types of 
violations in this study. 
 
We obtained information about enforcement actions against our sample companies 
between 1985 and 1987 from printouts produced by the EPA and 10K reports.  From 
these two sources we identified 2,076 violations attributable to our sample of 150 firms. 
Of these violations, there were 1,157 notices/warnings of violation, which we designated 
as non-serious violations; there were 919 agency and court orders/verdicts, which we 
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designated as serious.  Descriptive statistics and partial correlations are presented in 
Tables 1a and 1b. 
 
There is a dispute in the literature as to whether the absolute number of violations, or a 
proportionate measure relative to organization size should be used.  Some researchers 
(Clinard et al., 1979; Hill et al., 1992) have argued that using an absolute measure of size 
is inappropriate since larger firms have more opportunities to commit violations and 
organization size will therefore be positively correlated with violations even if the 
hypothesized reasons for the correlation are unfounded.  They contend that the correct 
question is whether larger firms commit proportionately more violations than smaller 
firms.  To capture this, some studies have used the ratio of violations to a unit of 
organization size as the dependent variable and then included size as one of the 
independent variables.  Using a proportionate measure, however, is equivalent to 
regressing the absolute number of violations on all independent variables interacted with 
size, thus including the square of size as an independent variable.  Since we are interested 
in the direct effect of the stated dimensions of corporate board structure on corporate 
illegality, and have not hypothesized interaction effects between any of these variables 
and organization size, we used an absolute measure of violations and included both size 
and a quadratic term for size as independent variables.  
 
Suppose we specify our model as: Violations = α+β​1​Size + β​2​Size​2​ + β​3​X, where X is a 
vector of all independent variables other than size.  The effect of an increase in 
corporation size, other things constant, is: β​1​ + 2 β​2​Size.  The way this effect changes 
with size, then, is: 2β​2​.  Thus, if β​1​ + 2β​2​Size>0, then violations increase with Size and if 
β​2​>0, then violations increase with Size at an increasing rate. 
 
Independent Variables​:  
Inside Directors​:​  This was measured by calculating a ratio of the number of inside board 
members, divided by the total number of board members for 1983 and 1984; the two 
ratios were then averaged.  All data for the independent variables was obtained from 
1983 and 1984 proxy statements.  
 
Joint CEO-Chairpersons​.  This was measured with a dummy variable, scored 1 if the 
CEO and the Chairperson were the same person during 1983 or 1984, and scored 0 if 
they were not.  
 
Value of Stock Owned by Directors and Officers​:  This measure is the total number of 
shares reported by each company as beneficially owned by all officers and directors at the 
beginning of each year, multiplied by an average of the highest and the lowest stock price 
during that year. The values for 1983 and 1984 were then averaged.  
 
Committees​:  This measure was created by using a dummy variable, scored 1 if a social 
responsibility, ethics, public affairs, or environmental committee existed on the board of 
directors during 1983 or 1984, and scored 0 if it did not. 
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Attorneys​:  This was measured using a dummy variable, scored 1 if there was an attorney 
on the board of directors during 1983 or 1984, and scored 0 if there was not. 
 
Control Variables:  
Because previous research on motive and opportunity variables has often produced 
positive results, we entered the four most commonly supported variables into our model 
as controls. 
 
Industry profitability​: We measured industry profitability as the two year (1983-1984) 
average return on assets for the four-digit SIC industry code in which the firm did the 
largest share of its business, using data from Dun & Bradstreet’s ​Industry Norms and Key 
Business Ratios​. 
 
Firm profitability​: This was calculated as a firm’s average return on assets (ROA) and its 
industry’s average ROA during the two fiscal year period of 1983-1984, using annual 
reports and Dun & Bradstreet data. 
 
Organization Size​: Using data from annual reports and Moody’s Industrial Reports, firm 
size was measured as the average number of employees for each firm during the 
1983-1984 time period. 
 
Industry Concentration​: This measure was based on data published by the U.S. Bureau of 
the Census in 1982. The industry concentration measure employed the 
Herfindahl-Hirshman index, calculated by squaring and summing the market shares of 
the fifty largest firms in an industry.  
 
Industry Control​:  
A few other studies have found that environmental violations tend to occur in some 
industries more than others; it is logical to assume this is because some manufacturing 
processes are more polluting than others.  For instance, the paper, chemical, petroleum, 
and primary metals industries have been found to be high violators (McKendall & 
Wagner, 1996).  To account for possible industry effects, we created a dummy variable 
equal to 1 for any firm with a primary SIC code of 26, 28, 29, or 33.  When this dummy 
variable was included in our regressions, the coefficients were statistically insignificant 
and no other estimated coefficients were significantly altered.  Therefore, we report the 
regression results without the industry controls included.  
 
Procedure:  
Because 37 of our sample firms had no serious violations and 28 had no non-serious 
violations, we used Tobit analysis to estimate the effects of board structure on violations. 
We entered firm size, industry concentration, industry profitability and firm profitability 
as control variables.  The regression results are presented in Table 2. 
 
Results 
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The results of the TOBIT regression analyses demonstrated that only one variable, the 
value of stock owned by corporate officers and directors, was positively and significantly 
associated with corporate illegality, and then only for serious violations.  As 
hypothesized, the greater the value of stock owned by officers and directors, the greater 
the number of violations committed.   All of the other hypotheses -- joint CEO/chair, 
ethics committee, and attorney on the board, were insignificant for all serious and 
non-serious violations. 
 
Discussion and Conclusions 
These findings suggest several things. First, our research, like that of Kesner et al. (1986) 
and Gautschi & Jones (1987), fails to support several of the most popular board reform 
propositions.  All three studies refute the contention that boards dominated by outsiders 
will improve social performance and result in fewer legal violations.  Reformers should 
perhaps consider additional vehicles to ensure corporate social performance.  
 
Secondly, we found that the presence of an ethics committee on the board had no 
significant effect on illegal actions.  This concurs with other studies which show various 
corporate ethical practices (i.e., codes, committees, training) to be unrelated to illegality 
(McKendall, 1990; Mathews, 1987).  It may be that such board committees, which often 
meet only a few times a year, are seen as mere window dressing, and not as a meaningful 
organizational force. 
 
Finally, the significant relationship between the value of stock ownership and illegal acts 
suggests that the degree of director’s and officers’ financial involvement in the firm may 
indeed have a compromising effect on the tendency of these people to carry out their 
oversight function (Kesner et al., 1986).  Board members and officers who own a greater 
dollar amount of stock may be more likely to overlook the consequences of committing a 
serious environmental violation, because they may feel that complying with the law will 
cost too much.  The high cost of compliance will affect profits, and drive the price of 
stock downward.  This would have a negative effect on personal wealth, and therefore 
should be avoided.  Board members and officers  who have greater stock interest in their 
companies may define the best interests of their firm in terms of short-run, financial 
performance indicators rather than more comprehensive outcomes.  
 
Our study does not support the contention that structuring a board in a certain way will 
act to prevent illegal activities.  It does, however, suggest that the personal circumstances 
of directors and officers, whomever they might be, are an influence on illegality. 
Daboub, Rasheed, Priem, & Gray (1995) recently advanced a theory that the 
characteristics of top management might have an impact on corporate illegal activity. 
Our finding lends tentative support to this hypothesis.  Certainly, it invites further 
research in an area which has received little empirical scrutiny.  
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Table 1a: Means and Standard 
Deviations 
  
 Mean Standard Deviation 
Non-serious violations 7.71 10.41 
Serious violations 6.127 8.354 
CEO/Chair 0.827 0.38 
Ethics Committee 0.22 0.42 
Lawyer 0.53 0.50 
% Inside Directors 33.77 12.28 
Industry Concentration 790.69 660.36 
Size (number of employees) 460.71 664.28 
Industry Profits 6.80 4.95 
Firm Profits 6.19 5.06 
Value of Stock 139.27 359.71 
 
Table 1b: 
Partial 
Correlation
s 
         
 % Inside 
Directors 
CEO/Chair Value of 
Stock 
Ethics 
Committee 
Lawyer Industry 
Profit 
Firm 
Profits 
Size  Industry 
Concentration 
% Inside 
Directors 1         
CEO/Chair -.130 1        
Value of Stock .168 -.086 1       
Ethics Committee -.022 .0306 -.050 1      
Lawyer .082 -.005 .095 .013 1     
Industry Profits .073 -.043 .027 .014 -.111 1    
Firm Profits .053 -.135 .154 .036 .054 .298 1   
Size  -.001 .047 .113 .276 -.029 -.053 .077 1  
Industry 
Concentration .042 -.041 -.047 .138 .041 -.139 .122 .280 1 
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Table 2: Tobit Regressions   
 Non-Serious Serious 
% Inside Directors .1028  
(1.40) 
.0448  
(0.83) 
CEO/Chair .2977  
(0.12) 
.2214  
(0.12) 
Stock Value Held by Officers and 
Directors 
4.79e09  
(1.76)* 
4.08e09  
(2.04)** 
Ethics Committee .7701  
(0.33) 
1.2003  
(0.69) 
Lawyer 2.6366  
(1.36) 
.4001  
(0.28) 
Industry Profits .5714  
(2.79)*** 
.3883  
(2.57)** 
Firm Profits  .3438  
(1.66)* 
-.4409 
(2.98)*** 
Size .0001  
(4.61)*** 
.0001  
(5.03)*** 
Size Squared  1.69e10  
(2.99)*** 
1.06e10  
(2.56)** 
Industry Concentration .0022  
(1.41) 
.00278  
(2.40)** 
Constant 11.8578  
(2.85)*** 
8.0308  
(2.60)*** 
Pseudo R​2 .050 .072 
Note​s:  "t"-statistics in parentheses 
         *p-value ​≤​ .10  
             **p-value ​≤​ .05 
            ***p-value ​≤​ .01  
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